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Domestic Relations
Domestic Relations; domestic violence
Code of Civil Procedure §527 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code
§§18290, 18291, 18292, 18293, 18294, 18295, 18296, 18297, 18298,
18299, 18300, 18301, 18302, 18303 (new).
AB 1019 (Fazio); STATS 1977, Ch 720
Support: California National Organization of Women; Commission on
the Status of Women
SB 91 (Presley); STATS 1977, Ch 892
Support: California Peace Officers' Association; California District At-
torneys' Association; California Rural Legal Assistance; Commission on
the Status of Women
The California Legislature has determined that there are hundreds of
thousands of persons who are regularly beaten and many who die as a
result of domestic violence [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18290).
Family conflicts account for more police calls than either murders, ag-
gravated batteries, or other serious crime [See Parnas, The Police Response
to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 WIs. L. REv. 914 n.2]. With spouse-
beating becoming more apparent, if not more prevalent, Chapters 720 and
892 have been enacted to afford greater protection to the battered spouse.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 720, a restraining order for the protec-
tion of a spouse could be obtained only during dissolution actions [Compare
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §527(b) with CAL. CIV. CODE §§4359 and 5102].
Chapter 720 amends Section 527 of the Code of Civil Procedure to
provide for the granting of a temporary restraining order to any person who,
prior to or at the time the order is granted, was actually residing with the
person at whom the order is directed regardless of whether an action for
legal separation, annulment, or dissolution has been commenced [CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §527(b)]. The stated purpose of these restraining orders is to
prevent a recurrence of actual domestic violence and to ensure a period of
separation for the parties involved [CAL. CI,. PROC. CODE §527(b)]. In
addition, Section 527 specifies that in order to obtain a "domestic violence"
restraining order, a party must satisfy the court of the necessity of the
restraining order, including a reasonable showing of "a past act or acts of
actual violence resulting in physical injury" [CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§527(b)]. Once a restraining order is issued the county clerk is required to
transmit the order the same day it was granted to the local law enforcement
agency having jurisdiction over the residence of the party who obtained the
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order or the residence at which the recurrence of actual domestic violence is
the subject of a temporary restraining order [CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§527(b)]. Furthermore, these law enforcement agencies are now given the
discretion of making information available concerning the existence and
current status of any restraining order to any law enforcement officer
responding to the scene of reported domestic violence [CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §527(b)].
Further, it is interesting to note the differences between the domestic
violence restraining order provided by Chapter 720 and the standard re-
straining order provided for in Code of Civil Procedure Section 527(a).
First, a domestic violence restraining order may be granted with or without
notice to the other party, whereas a standard order may be granted without
notice only when the facts of the situation show that "great or irreparable
injury would result" [Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §527(a) with CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §527(b)]. Second, unlike a standard restraining order, a
domestic violence restraining order that is granted with notice may remain in
effect for up to 30 days without having to show cause to continue the order
past 15 days. [Con.pare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §527(a) with CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE §527(b)]. Further, willful disobedience of a domestic violence
restraining order is now defined as a misdemeanor instead of as conduct
constituting criminal contempt, which is also punishable as a misdemeanor
[Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §527(b) with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 166(4)].
In realization of the need to develop "innovative strategies and services"
to deal with the problems attendant to domestic violence [CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 18290], the legislature has further established state supported
havens for battered spouses [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§18290-18303].
Although the state has previously recognized the need to care for battered
children [See CAL. Civ. CODE §232], and authorized the placing of injured
children in foster or group homes or in an institution [See Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 630-
33 (1975-76)], no public centers had previously been established for bat-
tered spouses [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18290]. Chapter 892 has
established at least four, but not more than six, project centers for victims of
domestic violence [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18292(a)]. To provide
geographically diverse protection for domestic violence victims, the centers
are to be established throughout the state with at least one center in northern
California, at least one center in central California, and at least one center in
southern California [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18292(b)]. Each
center is required to provide: (1) shelter available on a 24-hour-a-day,
seven-days-a-week basis; (2) a 24-houir crisis call phone line to be available
seven days a week; (3) temporary housing and food facilities; (4) psycho-
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logical support and peer counseling; (5) referral procedures to other services
in the community and follow-up service for such referrals; (6) a drop-in
center for victims of domestic violence who have not yet left their homes or
who have found other shelter but have a need for other services that could be
provided by the center; (7) arrangements for the children of the victims to
continue their schooling during the parent's stay at the center; and (8)
emergency transportation to the center [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18294].
Furthermore, each center is required "to the extent possible, and in conjunc-
tion with already existing community services" to obtain for the victims of
domestic violence medical care, legal assistance, psychological support and
counseling, and information about existing social services such as family or
job counseling [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18295].
The centers are required to employ a standardized intake and follow-up
form that is to be developed by the State Department of Health [CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §18300], which will confidentially record socioeconomic
data about the person served, a history of that person's contact with the
center, descriptions of the episodes of domestic violence and probable
causes thereof, and the follow-up services provided by the center as well as
such other pertinent data that the State Department of Health deems neces-
sary [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18300]. Each center is also required to
submit quarterly progress reports concerning its activities and maintain
quarterly and final fiscal reports in a form prescribed by the State Depart-
ment of Health [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§18299, 18301]. Each center is
required to submit final project reports to the State Department of Health on
or before October 1, 1979, with these reports to be synthesized by that
department and then filed with the legislature on or before January 1, 1980
[CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§18302, 18303]. Since Chapter 892 is only to
remain in effect until June 30, 1980, these final project reports apparently
will aid the legislature in determining the future of similar projects [Com-
pare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §18302 and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§18303 with CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 892, §3, at -].
Through the enactment of Chapters 720 and 892, the legislature has taken
steps to protect California citizens from domestic violence by providing that
victims of domestic violence may now request a temporary restraining order
for the purpose of obtaining a court imposed cooling off period [See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §527(a)] and may, in addition, take refuge in state
supported shelters [See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18290]. Thus, Chapters
720 and 892 would appear to be positive measures designed to reduce the
incidence of domestic violence in California and to provide both immediate
and long term assistance to victims of this violence.
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See Generally:
1) 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies §§85-94 (temporary restrain-
ing orders) (2d ed. 1970).
2) Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259 (1971).
Domestic Relations; same sex marriages
Civil Code §§4100, 4101 (amended).
AB 607 (Nestande); STATS 1977, Ch 339
Support: County Clerks' Association of California
Opposition: Gay Rights Chapter of American Civil Liberties Union
Under prior law, marriage was defined as "a personal relationship arising
out of a civil contract" [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1608, §8, at 3314], which
ambiguously left unanswered the legality of same-sex marriages. Although
courts in other jurisdictions have rejected same-sex marriages as being no
marriage at all [See, e.g., McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir.
1976); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311-12, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971); Anonymous
v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (1971);
Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 249, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974)],
Chapter 339, by requiring marriage to be between a male and a female,
appears to be the first definitive statement on same-sex marriages in
California.
Chapter 339 amends Section 4100 of the Civil Code to define marriage as
"a personal relationship arising out of a civil contract between a man and a
woman" (emphasis added). According to several courts, such language is
redundant [See, e.g., McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54, 55 (8th Cir.
1976); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311-12, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (1971); Anonymous
v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 984, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (1971);
Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 249, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974). See
generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (4th ed. 1968)]. One court went
so far as to state that the terms "husband and wife" clearly and obviously
denoted man and woman [Zanone v. Sprague, 16 Cal. App. 333, 343, 116
P. 989, 993 (1911)]. Similarly, several courts' analyses were based on
traditional definitions of marriage and of such terms as "husband" and
"wife" [See, e.g., id.; Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 249-50, 522
P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974)]. The California Legislature, however, apparently
determined that further clarification was still necessary and has responded
by insertng specific language into Section 4100 of the Civil Code to deny
same-sex marriages [See CAL. CIv. CODE §4100]. Furthermore, Section
4101 of the Civil Code has been similarly amended to provide that the
capacity to consent to marriage only exists between unmarried males and
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females 18 years of age or older and that such males and females under the
age of 18 may consent to marriage if certain documents are filed with the
clerk issuing the marriage license [CAL. CIV. CODE §4101(a)-(b)]. It should
be noted, however, that Chapter 339 affects only the licensing of marriages,
and that Section 4213 of the Civil Code, which provides that couples who
have been living together as "man and wife" may be married by a clergy-
man without the requisite marriage license, remains unaffected by Chapter
339.
Chapter 339 is an apparent attempt to prevent homosexual marriages in
California. By amending Sections 4100 and 4101 of the Civil Code to make
specific references to "man and woman" and "male and female," the
legislature has made it clear that same-sex relationships cannot qualify for
marriage licenses.
See Generally:
1) Annot., 63 A.L.R. 3d 1199 (same-sex marriages) (1975).
Domestic Relations; modification of spousal support and gifts of
community personal property
Civil Code §§4531, 4812, 5110, 5125 (amended).
AB 1269 (Maddy); STATS 1977, Ch 332
Although the state courts have consistently differentiated between a
discharge in bankruptcy of spousal support and a discharge of a property
settlement, Section 4812 apparently diminishes this dichotomy. Prior to the
enactment of Chapter 332, a discharge in bankruptcy of spousal support
obligations could be set aside and the obligation reinstated [Roberts v.
Roberts, 261 Cal. App. 2d 424, 427, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (1968)]. On the
other hand, a discharge of a property settlement relieved the obligor of any
legal duty to fulfill his or her obligation [Id.; Smalley v. Smalley, 176 Cal.
App. 2d 374, 375, 1 Cal. Rptr. 440, 442 (1960)]. This interpretation was
consistent with the provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Act concerning
discharges [11 U.S.C. 35(a)(7) (1970)] and has led the courts to distinguish
between spousal support and property settlement payments owed prior to
discharge before determining whether the particular payments could be
reinstated or would be completely discharged [Myhers v. Myhers, 6 Cal.
App. 3d 855, 858, 86 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 (1970); Roberts v. Roberts, 261
Cal. App. 2d 424, 427, 68 Cal. Rptr. 59, 61 (1968); see IA COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY §§17.18, 17.19 (Moore ed. 1976)]. Section 4812 no longer
requires this distinction, since the court may now consider discharged
property settlements in establishing an adequate amount of support for a
former spouse.
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Prior to the enactment of Chapter 332, when determining the modification
of spousal support, the law limited a court's analysis to the "circumstances
of the respective parties" without defining what circumstances the courts
could consider [CAL. STATS. 1969, c. 1608, §8, at 3337]. Chapter 332 now
permits the courts to consider discharged property settlements as a change
that may justify modification of spousal support [CAL. CIV. CODE §4812].
To illustrate, prior law allowed the discharge of property settlements with-
out a concomitant modification of spousal support, resulting in a reduction
of one spouse's payment obligation without compensating the other spouse,
a situation apparently remedied by Section 4812. This section now allows
the court to compensate the other spouse through a readjustment of spousal
support [CAL. Civ. CODE §4812; see In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App.
3d 93, 116-17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 72-73 (1974); In re Marriage of Rosan,
24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 892-93, 101 Cal. Rptr. 295, 300-01 (1972)]. Conse-
quently, although a property settlement may be discharged in bankruptcy, a
payment obligation can now still survive in the form of adjusted spousal
support [CAL. CIv. CODE §4812].
Chapter 332 also amends Section 5125 of the Civil Code to reinstate the
requirement of written consent by one's spouse to validate a gift of commu-
nity personal property. The requirement of written consent was deleted from
the Civil Code in 1975 after having been a part of the code since 1872 [CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 1206, §4, at 2609]. The result of this deletion was to limit
disposal of community personal property to those situations where valuable
consideration was received [CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1206, §4, at 2609]. Thus,
consent by a spouse could not validate a gift of community personal
property. Since Chapter 332 contains language identical to that deleted in
1975-providing that a valid disposition of community personal property
may be made either for valuable consideration or with the written consent of
the other spouse-it is arguable that the courts will apply this new law in a
manner that is consistent with earlier cases. Accordingly, a simple withhold-
ing of written consent may now be sufficient to invalidate a gift of commu-
nity personal property [See Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2d 540, 544, 140 P.2d
386, 388 (1943)], and such gifts made without this consent are now appar-
ently voidable [See Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369, 369 P.2d 481,
482, 19 Cal. Rptr. 793, 794 (1962)]. Furthermore, it would seem that a gift
of community personal property may be ratified after a conveyance has been
completed [See Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 788, 158 P. 537, 542
(1916)]. Thus, it would appear that, just as before 1975, community person-
al property may now be disposed of either for valuable consideration or with
the written consent of one's spouse.
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See Generally:
1) 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property §§58-66 (gifts of
community property) (8th ed. 1973), (Supp. 1976).
Domestic Relations; joinder of employee benefit plans
Civil Code §§4363.1, 4363.2, 4363.3 (new); §§4351, 4363 (amended).
AB 1090 (McAlister); STATS 1977, Ch 860
Support: Family Law Section of the State Bar of California; Public
Employees' Retirement System
In recent years, the courts have consistently established that pension and
retirement benefits, to the extent that these benefits are earned during
marriage, are community property and subject to disposition in dissolution
proceeding [E.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847, 544 P.2d
561, 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638 (1976); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10
Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974);
Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 470, 492 P.2d 13, 19, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325,
331 (1972); Phillipson v. Board of Admin., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 40,473 P.2d 765,
769, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 65 (1970); In re Marriage of Ward, 50 Cal. App. 3d
150, 153, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1975)]. The recognition of employee
benefits as community property has in turn created certain problems for the
courts, among which is the difficulty of binding the benefit plan to the
disposition as ordered by the court in a dissolution action, possibly allowing
one of the parties to avoid the court order to distribute the benefits of the
plan [See In re Marriage of Maunder, 57 Cal. App. 3d 570, 572, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 707, 708 (1976)]. Chapter 860 has apparently been enacted to resolve
this problem.
The background for Chapter 860 would seem to be found in the recent
California Appellate Court decision of In re Marriage of Sommers [53 Cal.
App. 3d 509, 126 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1975)], in which the court held that a
pension plan could be joined in a dissolution action, thereby binding the
pension plan to the court-ordered property disposition [Id. at 514, 126 Cal.
Rptr. at 223]. In Sommers, the court relied upon California Rules of the
Court 1252 and 1254, which allow for the joinder of any third person who
has in his or her possession any property that was subject to the disposition
of the court [Id., at 513, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 223]. The court found that since
the employee's interest in the pension plan had vested there was a communi-
ty property interest and consequently the plan was subject to disposition in
accordance with the court's orders [Id., at 514, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 223].
Apparently, from this background the legislature has enacted Chapter 860
which provides for the joinder of employee pension benefit plans as a party
to any proceeding under the Family Law Act [See CAL. CIV. CODE
AOQ Pacific Law Journal Vol. 9
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§4363.1]. As used in the Family Law Act, the term "employee pension
benefit plan" includes public and private retirement and pension plans
[CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.3]. Chapter 860 provides that in such proceedings
an order or judgment against an employee pension benefit plan is enforce-
able only if the plan has been joined as a party to the proceeding [CAL. CIV.
CODE §4351]. Despite the apparent application of this joinder procedure to
all proceedings under the Family Law Act [See CAL. Civ. CODE §4351],
any judgment establishing community or quasi-community property rights
in an employee pension benefit plan will apparently be issued either in an
action for marriage dissolution or legal separation unless the court expressly
reserves jurisdiction over the employee pension benefit plan [See CAL. Civ.
CODE §4800(a)]. Thus, this review of Chapter 860 will focus only upon the
joining of employee pension benefit plans in these Family Law Act proceed-
ings.
Section 4363.1 of the Civil Code, as added by Chapter 860, sets forth the
following preconditions to the joinder of an employee pension benefit plan
to an action for dissolution or legal separation or any other proceeding under
the Family Law Act: (1) the party seeking to join the plan has made a written
application to the clerk requesting that the plan be joined [CAL. CIV. CODE
§4363.1(a)]; (2) the employee pension benefit plan to be joined, or its
trustee, administrator, or designated agent, has been served with a copy of
the joinder request, a copy of the summons, and a blank copy of a notice of
appearance [CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.1(a)]; and (3) within 45 days after the
service of the joinder request and summons, a notice of appearance has been
filed and served upon the party requesting joinder in which the benefit plan
must have indicated its decision to be governed by Section 4363.2 or be
deemed to have consented to this option [CAL. CIV. CODE §4363. 1(b)]. If
the employee pension benefit plan has been served, but fails to file a notice
of appearance, a notice of motion to quash service of summons, or a notice
of the filing of a petition for writ of mandate, the clerk of the court is
required to enter the default of the employee pension benefit plan pursuant
to Sections 585 and 586 of the Code of Civil Procedure [CAL. Civ. CODE
§4363.1(c)].
An employee pension benefit plan may elect to be governed by newly
created Section 4363.2 of the Civil Code [CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.1(b)],
which provides for certain procedural protections governing the joinder of
these plans in dissolution and legal separation actions. Section 4363.2
allows the employee pension benefit plan the option to appear at any hearing
in any proceeding in which the benefit plan has been joined and also
establishes a 30-day grace period before any court order that affects the plan
will take effect unless the plan has waived this provision in writing [CAL.
Civ. CODE §4363.2(a)]. Furthermore, during this 30-day period, the plan
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may file a motion to set aside or modify the court ordered disposition of the
plan's benefits and thus delay the effect of the disputed order until the court
rules on the motion [CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.2(a)]. At any hearing on a
motion to set aside or modify the provisions of the court order, further
evidence on any issue relating to the parties' rights under the benefit plan or
to the parties' community or quasi-community interest in the plan may be
presented by any of the parties to the action [CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.2(b)].
As a result of such a hearing, a court may set aside or modify the ordered
disposition of an employee pension benefit plan, but Chapter 860 specifies
that the grounds for such action must include, but are not limited to the
following: (1) neither party has any interest, vested or unvested, in the
employee pension benefit plan; (2) greater or different rights have been
granted to the employee or nonemployee spouse, or to both combined, than
the employee held under the terms of the benefit plan; (3) the order requires
payment to the nonemployee spouse of a benefit that is payable only after
the death of the employee spouse to a person designated by the benefit plan
and not chosen by the employee spouse; (4) the order requires the benefit
plan to make payments to the nonemployee spouse after his or her death;
and (5) the order awards to the nonemployee spouse any of the employee's
separate property interest, or more than 50 percent of the community or
quasi-community interest of the employee under the terms of the plan [CAL.
CIV. CODE §4363.2(c)].
Finally, Chapter 860 specifies that the requirements for joinder of an
employee pension benefit plan in any proceeding under the Family Law Act
and the provisions allowing election by such a plan to be governed by
Section 4363.2 are applicable to all orders and judgments entered under the
Family Law Act after January 1, 1977 [See CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 860, §6,
at -]. Furthermore, even if an employee pension benefit plan has been
joined as a party in a proceeding under the Family Law Act prior to January
1, 1977, such a plan may still elect to appear and move to modify or set
aside the ordered disposition of the benefits of the pension or retirement plan
by filing a written election to be governed by this section with the court [See
CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 860, §6, at -; CAL. CIV. CODE §4363.2]. A copy of
this written election must be served upon the party who requested the joinder
of the employee pension benefit plan in the manner prescribed by law [CAL.
STATS. 1977, c. 860, §6, at -].
Chapter 860 has established a detailed procedure for joinder of employee
pension benefit plans in proceedings under the Family Law Act [See CAL.
CIV. CODE §§4363-4363.2]. Included in the new joinder scheme are pro-
cedural safeguards that would appear to deter the unnecessary joinder of
benefit plans, allow for the review of court ordered disposition of benefits,
and to ensure the enforcement of such dispositions.
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See Generally:
1) 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Community Property §§22, 23 (pension and
retirement benefits) (8th ed. 1974).
Domestic Relations; recoupment for custody investigations
Civil Code §4602 (amended).
SB 368 (Nejedly); STATS 1977, Ch 772
Support: California Organization of Police and Sheriffs
Opposition: Western Center on Law and Poverty
Section 4602 of the Civil Code requires probation officers or domestic
relations investigators [See generally CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §263; see also
Pfaff, Domestic Relations Investigators, 36 L.A. BAR BULL. 192 (1961)],
when directed by any court in a proceeding under the Family Law Act [CAL.
CIV. CODE §§4000-5174], to conduct a custody investigation and to file a
written confidential report that may be considered by the court. These
reports must also be made available to the parties or their attorneys at least
ten days before any hearing regarding custody of a child and may be
received in evidence upon stipulation of all interested parties [CAL. CIV.
CODE §4602].
Chapter 772 has added a provision to Section 4602 that requires a court to
inquire into the financial condition of the person(s) charged with support and
maintenance of the child upon whom the custody investigation was made,
and if the person(s) is found able, to make an order requiring such person(s)
to repay the county that portion of the expense of the investigation and
report that the court deems proper. Repayment is to be made to a county
officer to be designated by the board of supervisors [CAL. CIV. CODE
§4602].
California statutes provide for investigations into child welfare cases of
various types [See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §263 (domestic relations
cases investigators); CAL. PROB. CODE §1443 (guardianship petition investi-
gations); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §281 (probation officers' investigations
and reports)], but Chapter 772 has only provided recoupment for custody
investigations conducted in conjunction with proceedings under the Family
Law Act.
See Generally:
1) CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO THE FAMILY LAW ACT
PRACTICE §617 (2d ed. 1972).
Domestic Relations; adoption procedures
Civil Code §§7008, 7017 (amended).
AB 994 (Stirling); STATS 1977, Ch 207
Support: Volunteer Legislative Advocate for Children
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Chapter 207 makes several "technical modifications" to the Uniform
Parentage Act [CAL. Civ. CODE §§7000-7018] in an attempt to "clarify
[the] existing law" applicable to adoption procedures [CAL. STATS. 1977, c.
207, §3, at -]. In the area of parental rights, the prior law required that
notice of adoption proceedings need only be given to the presumed or legal
father of a child whose mother had relinquished, consented to, or had
proposed to relinquish the child for adoption, but no concomitant prescrip-
tion was applied to such acts by a father [See CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1244,
§ 11, at 3200]. In apparent recognition that both parents retain residual rights
in the child [See Adoption of Rebecca B., 68 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199, 137
Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1977)], Chapter 207 now requires that there be an
identical attempt to notify the mother should a father act to allow adoption of
a child unless the mother's relationship to the child has been previously
terminated by the court, or the mother has voluntarily relinquished or
consented to the child's adoption [CAL. CIV. CODE §7017(a)(2)]. Further,
Chapter 207 directs that any order dispensing with a father's consent to the
adoption of a child may be appealed in the same manner as is an order
decreeing a person to be a ward of the juvenile court [CAL. CIV. CODE
§7017(g)]. Appeals from orders of wardship are identical to all other appeals
except that: (1) the order can be stayed pending resolution only if suitable
provision is made for the maintenance, care, and custody of the minor
involved during the appeal process; and (2) the appeal is given precedence
over all other cases [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §800].
Chapter 207 also amends Civil Code Section 7008 which previously
required that any child subject to an adoption proceeding be made a party to
the action [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1244, §11, at 3199]. Joinder in adoption
proceedings is now mandatory for children 12 years of age or older and
discretionary in cases involving younger children [CAL. CIV. CODE §7008].
The age distinction made by Section 7008 brings this joinder provision into
conformity with existing law, which requires that only children over 12
years of age must consent to their adoption [See CAL. CIV. CODE §225].
Finally, Chapter 207 retains the requirement that any child, regardless of
age, who is made a party to an adoption action must be represented by a
guardian ad litem, but removes a prior prohibition against appointment of
the mother or father to this representative position [Compare CAL. CIV.
CODE §7008 with CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 1244, §11, at 3199], a proscription
that has been indicated by one court to protect the minor's rights [Everett v.
Everett, 57 Cal. App. 3d 65, 71 n.9, 129 Cal. Rptr. 8, 12 n.9 (1976)]. Thus,
Chapter 207 clarifies adoption procedures by: (1) providing equal preadop-
tion notice for both natural parents; (2) providing for an appeal procedure
whenever parental consent is dispensed with; (3) specifying when it is
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necessary to join the subject child; and (4) permitting either parent to serve
as guardian ad litem in an adoption proceeding.
See Generally:
I) Comment, The Role of the Child's Wishes in California Custody Proceedings, 6 U. CAL.
D. L. REv. 332 (1973).
Domestic relations; adoptions-attorney representation
Civil Code §225m (new).
AB 309 (McVittie); STATS 1977, Ch 718
Support: California Association of Adoption Agencies
The Civil Code prescribes the legal parameters and procedures applicable
to the adoption process [See CAL. CiV. CODE §224-224s]. Chapter 718 has
added Section 225m to the Civil Code to prohibit an attorney from undertak-
ing the representation of both the prospective adoptive parents and the
natural parents of a child in either the negotiation process or the legal
proceedings attendant to adoption. Section 225m denominates such dual
representation as "unethical" unless written consent is obtained from both
parties. Excepted from this limitation are adoptions by stepparents and those
in which a State Department of Health licensed organization joins in the
underlying petition for adoption [CAL. Civ. CODE 225m]. Since it is con-
ceivable that the natural parents in a contested adoption proceeding may
have insufficient resources to retain private counsel, Chapter 718 permits
the court to appoint an attorney to represent the natural parents in such
adoption negotiation and proceedings upon the motion of any party [CAL.
CIV. CODE §225m].
Read in light of several provisions of the Business and Professions Code,
Chapter 718 appears to expose an attorney entering into an unconsented dual
representation of both parties to an adoption proceeding to a risk of suspen-
sion or disbarment. Section 6103 indicates that violation of the oath taken by
an attorney, or of his or her duties as an attorney, constitutes cause for
suspension or disbarment [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6103]. Further, each
attorney must, by law, take an oath to "faithfully discharge the duties of an
attorney at law" upon admission to the bar [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§6067]. Finally, one element of an attorney's statutory duty is to support the
laws of California [CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6068(a)] Thus, Chapter 718
appears to provide both the adoptive and natural parents with the opportuni-
ty to be represented by independent counsel in any adoption negotiation or
proceeding by subjecting any attorney who attempts to undertake such dual
representation without the written consent of both parties to a threat of
suspension or disbarment [See CAL. CIV. CODE §225m].
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See Generally:
1) Arden v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 2d 310, 321 P.2d 6 (1954) (discipline of attorney for conflict of
interest in adoption process).
2) Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Laws and Proposals for Legis-
lative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10 (1975).
3) State Bar of California, Committee on Adoptions, The Attorney's Role in Independent
Adoptions, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 970 (1961).
4) Comment, Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAw. 48 (1976).
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Civil Code §224.1 (new).
AB 198 (Stirling); STATS 1977, Ch 376
Support: California Association of Adoption Agencies; Foster Parents
Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 376, there was an apparent oversight in
the law regulating adoption. Unless a child had been abandoned, or custody
had been voluntarily relinquished or judicially withdrawn, it was recognized
that the consent of the natural parents was required before a child could be
adopted [See CAL. CIV. CODE §224], but the law previously contained no
provision for obtaining consent if the natural parents and other persons
whose consent to the adoption was required by law were dead. Consequent-
ly, it was suggested in the past that "approval" be obtained from a close
relative or foster parent [See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR,
CALiFORNIA FAMILY LAWYER §19.54 (1961)]. Chapter 376 appears to cor-
rect this oversight by providing that when a child is in the costody of a
public agency or a licensed adoption agency and it has been established that
the persons whose consent to the adoption is required by law, are deceased,
the State Department of Health or a licensed adoption agency may now
petition the court for the right to custody and control of the child, obtaining
at the same time the authority to consent to the child's adoption [CAL. CIV.
CODE §224.1]. Under the provisions of Section 224.1, however, no agency
is permitted to petition for control of the child if a guardian has been
appointed by will. Furthermore, guidelines are provided to protect the
child's interest by requiring that notice of an agency's petition for control be
given to all known relatives up to and including the third degree of lineal and
collateral consanguinity, which includes all great grandparents, grandpa-
rents, uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, brothers and sisters [CAL. CIV. CODE
§224.1; see CAL. PROB. CODE §§252, 253]. Thus, Chapter 376 would
appear to facilitate the adoption of fully-orphaned children by establishing a
specific procedure through which public agencies having custody of such
minors may now obtain authority to place these children for adoption [See
CAL. Civ. CODE §224.1].
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